Railway Mania in 1845 in the Severn Valley
John Marshall's book on 'The Severn Valley Railway' from 1989 is recognised as the definitive history of the line. However, while covering the pre-history of the river and canal trade and the promotion of the Severn Valley Railway Bill, it only mentions one failed proposal (that of the Shropshire Union Railways and Canal Company) to any extent. In fact, there were no less than five proposals where Companies were formed and shares sold for a railway which included a line between Bewdley and Bridgnorth with many others planned to run from Kidderminster to Bewdley/Stourport or from Bridgnorth to Ironbridge and beyond. This article attempts to elaborate on the proposals, the reasons for the hive of activity in the momentous year 1845 and why the plans failed.
| If you will listen to my song | |
| I'll not detain you long. | |
| On the 1st May the folks did throng | |
| To view the Oxford railway. | |
| To have a ride- what a treat- | |
| Father, mother, son and daughter | |
| Along the line like one o'clock | |
| By fire and steam and water. | |
| Chorus: | Rifum, Tifum, mirth and fun. |
| Don't you wonder how it's done? | |
| Carriages without horses run | |
| On the 'Hampton and Oxford Railway. |
The Background[edit | edit source]
The industrial revolution which began around 1760 had stimulated manufacturing and trade, encouraged migration to the towns and industrial areas and created wealth among the land owners and the proprietors and, to some extent, the smaller traders. The Shropshire coalfield in the area between Coalport/Broseley and what is now Telford, was at its height in the early part of the 19th century (mining 20,000 tons/week) and Coalbrookdale Foundry turned out 2,000 tons of iron /week by 1850. Carpet manufacturers had 2,000 looms and were the major employers in Kidderminster and the opening of the Staffordshire and Worcestershire Canal from Wolverhampton via Kidderminster to Stourport in 1772 had precipitated the growth of that town with tanneries, ironmongery and timber featuring. The census in 1831 registered populations of Kidderminster 14,981; Bewdley 3,908 and Bridgnorth 6,284 (which are around half of today's population).
The big contention to the manufacturers and traders was the difficulty and cost of transport with goods needing to move internationally as well as nationally. Raw materials for the textile trade and carpets came from abroad, machinery was now powered by steam engines requiring transfer of coal and manufactured goods from Birmingham and the Black Country and movement was required to the ports for export. The River Severn was the main artery of movement prior to the canal revolution with Severn 'trows' moving goods up to Bewdley and smaller vessels beyond (bow—hauled against the flow). Pack horses from Bewdley were used from there to the Welsh Marches and to the Black Country. In the Coalbrookdale area many waggonways and tramways had been built in the 18th and early 19th centuries to take goods down to the Severn and after the Shropshire Canal was opened in 1799, to there. These were horse drawn tubs on wooden rails, which were superseded by iron rails by 1800.
The Turnpike Acts in the early 19th century had improved the highway network such that by 1830 across the country 20,000 miles were administered by Trusts representing 17% of the network. The better surfaces contributed to the average speeds of stage coaches increasing to 8 miles per hour (doubling since 1750s). Horse drawn wagons had taken over from the pack horses but were much slower than the coaches. The scheduled coaches had increased since 1815 and on the busier routes ran daily or twice daily. They were expensive – the 'Red Rover' from Bewdley to Birmingham in 1841 cost 5s on the outside and 8s inside. It still took over 10 hours to reach London from Kidderminster. While the canals were much more attractive than the roads for moving goods (one horse could haul a narrowboat carrying 30 tons of coal or stone), they were still slow – it could take almost a week from Birmingham to Bristol.
The Early Schemes[edit | edit source]
The first successful public railway was the Stockton and Darlington which opened in 1825 with the first route between cities that from Liverpool to Manchester which opened in 1830. In 1831 the latter carried 445,000 passengers and transported 108,000 tons of goods netting a profit of £80,000 which gave a very good return on the investment for the shareholders. It is therefore not surprising that there was great interest nationally with landowners, Members of Parliament (who had authorised the Bills), manufacturers and traders in the Severn Valley being attracted by the economic benefits to their area.
The earliest record of interest appears to be from the 'Merchant Venturers' of Bristol who met on 13th December 1824 and again on 24th January 1825. At the first meeting they agreed to accept subscriptions for a Bristol, Northern and Western Railway (all 16,000 shares were taken up) with the later meeting agreeing to concentrate on a railway between Bristol and Birmingham. There was said to be 78,000 tons of goods moved annually between the two cities. A route was surveyed in 1825 but a financial crisis delayed matters. Meanwhile, a Bristol and Gloucestershire Railway was promoted which received Royal Assent on 19th June 1928. In reality, it was a tramway taking coal from Coalpit Heath the 9 miles to the River Avon at Bristol (the route was not fully open until 1836 and largely used by the eventual Bristol and Gloucester Railway which opened on 6th July 1844). In 1832 Isambard Kingdom Brunel was asked to survey a 'cheap' route between Birmingham and Gloucester which he did, avoiding the Lickey hills, but it also failed to proceed due to lack of funds.
Meanwhile two trunk routes did receive powers from Parliament – the London and Birmingham Railway and the Grand Junction Railway (Warrington to Birmingham) in 1833, seeking £3.5million of capital between them. A public meeting was held at the Guildhall in Worcester on 15th January 1834 where two routes were put forward, one Birmingham to Gloucester direct by Brunel (presumably, the one he had surveyed) and one via Stourbridge, Kidderminster and Worcester described by a Mr Wooddeson. The Worcester Committee (so formed) agreed only to support a line via Worcester hence precipitating the Grand Connection Railway. The promoters of the Bristol and Birmingham Railway commissioned a new survey by Captain WS Moorson in 1834 and his route by-passed Bromsgrove, Droitwich, Worcester, and almost Cheltenham, to save costs on urban land purchases. It also included inclines to rise from the Severn valley to the Birmingham plateau (now known as the Lickey Incline).
On 4th November 1835 a meeting was held in Worcester to consider the propriety of surveying a line for a railway on the west side of the River Severn to go from Gloucester to Birmingham via Kidderminster as the formative Birmingham and Gloucester Railway wanted to go via Spetchley rather than Worcester itself. The citizens of Worcester resolved to survey their own line. By 31st December 1835 the Worcestershire Chronical was reporting on the launch of the Grand Connection Railway from Gloucester to Worcester (where the river would be crossed), Stourport, Kidderminster to Stourbridge where one line would proceed to Birmingham with a branch via Dudley to Wolverhampton. The Engineer was Colonel George Landmann and the Chairman Robert Berkeley of Spetchley. It described the survey as partially complete and professed that the line would be linking Gloucester with Liverpool. The capital to be raised was said to be £800,000 and the share offer was said to be fully subscribed (only 10% had to be paid up front); Charles Talbot from Kidderminster and George Baldwin from Stourport both put their names forward as supporters.
On 5th March 1836 the Birmingham, Dudley and Wolverhampton Railway (BDWR) Directors met with Charles Shaw in the Chair. The Worcestershire Chronicle reported that Mr Leather, their Engineer, had completed his survey of a line from the Grand Junction Railway, near Wolverhampton through Dudley, Stourbridge and Kidderminster to Stourport, joining with the Birmingham and Gloucester Railway proposals. They resolved that the extended line should be adopted and that at a forthcoming meeting applications for shares should be invited. The Birmingham Advertiser speculated that the BDWR Committee were trying to force the hand of the Grand Connection Railway promoters who had already had applications for 18,500 shares. A notice appeared the London Gazette on 5th November 1836 for a Birmingham, Dudley, Stourbridge and Wolverhampton Railway Bill to go to the 1837 session of Parliament. The description of the route did not include a line south of Stourbridge. The Bill did not proceed to the Committee stage presumably not satisfying Standing Orders.
The preparations continued for a Bill for the Grand Connection to be presented to Parliament at the end of November 1836 at the same time as the Birmingham and Gloucester Bill. A public meeting was held in Worcester on 31st March 1836 to consider the expediency of opposing the Birmingham and Gloucester Railway proposals. It was said that the Directors of that Company had bound themselves in a penalty of £70,000 to make a branch to join the Grand Connection Railway and on that score the proposed opposition was withdrawn. The Grand Connection Bill went into Committee in Parliament in February 1837 where it was strongly opposed by the Canal Companies and by several land owners. The Committee was divided on whether the preamble was proved voting 15 for and 14 against. The 1st and 2nd readings took place on 20th and 28th February respectively. General Lygon, the Chairman of the Committee, continued to support the undertaking. On returning to the House of Commons, the Bill was thrown out by 165 votes to 88 on 9th May. The principal argument used was that certain land owners said it would destroy the beauty of the County of Worcester. Meanwhile the Birmingham and Gloucester proposals were successful, receiving authorisation on 22nd April 1837.
The promoters of the Grand Connection Railway were not finished. They reapplied in November 1836 but this time the railway would start at Abbots Wood at a junction with the Birmingham and Gloucester finishing at Bushbury, Wolverhampton at the Grand Junction Railway with a branch from Kinver to Stourbridge. This time the Capital was £820,000 with the principal subscribers with £5,000 each were: Matthew Pierpoint (Chairman), Charles Wordell, Thomas Hughes, William Stallard and George Becke. The first four were from Worcester (bankers and merchants) and the fifth from London. The route included what were said to be 5 level sections and 8 inclines. This proposed Bill also failed in 1838, although the promoters (particularly John Hyde and Matthew Pierpoint) continued to be diligent in responding to the Birmingham and Gloucester Railway's plans for branches to honour the Worcester link (stage coaches did meet the trains at Spetchley when the line opened in June 1840 to Bromsgrove and throughout on 17th December 1840). In total Parliament approved Railway Acts of 18 in 1835, 35 in 1836 and 14 in 1837. The Birmingham and Gloucester was not particularly successful as it avoided the centres and goods required transhipment at Gloucester (from narrow gauge to broad gauge) – in October 1842 £100 shares were selling for £42 and in January 1845 it was amalgamated with the Bristol and Gloucester Railway with the Midland Railway taking a long lease in 1846 offering 6% on the capital whereas the Great Western Railway only offered 5.5%.
In 1840 the Railway Commissioners were engaged in determining what would be the most desirable route for a grand trunk line between the metropolis and the Welsh coast and on to Ireland (then part of Great Britain). One project was to carry a line from Didcot on the Great Western Railway to Port Dynllaen in Brecknockshire and the other route was from Chester to Holyhead via Shrewsbury. On 17th March 1840 a public meeting was held in Worcester with John Dent in the chair. The Chamber of Commerce wanted subscriptions procured to survey a line through the County for submitting to the Commissioners. The April report favoured the Holyhead route because the harbour was a better starting point for vessels. By 1842 there were 1,951 miles of railway track opened in Great Britain but the early 1840s saw a period of poor economic growth with declines in production and the demands on shareholders to pay for the construction of the new lines led to difficulties in raising monies. Railway Acts in 1840 and 1842 gave powers to the Board of Trade to inspect new lines to approve Companies Bye-laws, to regulate connections and to submit statistical returns.
The Year 1844[edit | edit source]
The year 1844 saw renewed interest in connecting communities and the industrial areas into the rail network. There was now a basic network linking the cities of London, Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Bristol, Southampton, Derby, Leeds, Newcastle and Portsmouth but there was serious concern at the charges being made, hence the 5 reports from the House of Commons Select Committee on Railways between February and April 1844. The South Staffordshire iron and coal interests agitated about the high charges on the London and Birmingham Railway and difficulties in transferring goods between Grand Junction and London and Birmingham at the latter connection. They wanted their own route to the metropolis. The Great Western Railway which opened between London and Bristol in 1841 was constructing a link between Didcot and Oxford and was eyeing the area of the West Midlands in which to expand. The London and Birmingham were also looking south of Rugby.
The Great Western Railway's Engineer, Isambard Kingdom Brunel, prepared a proposal on the broad gauge (7foot and 1/4inch) which became the Oxford, Worcester and Wolverhampton Railway while the Engineer for the London and Birmingham, Robert Stephenson, projected a scheme then called the London and Worcester and Rugby and Oxford Railway Company which was subsequently renamed the London, Worcester and South Staffordshire Railway Company to the narrow gauge (4foot 8 &feac12;inch). On 19th March 1844 at a gathering of tradesmen in Worcester, Mr FT Elgie, Solicitor, spoke in favour of the proposal by the Great Western Company to construct the Oxford, Worcester and Wolverhampton Railway (OWWR). Mr WSP Hughes said the Grand Connection Railway would serve Worcester well and was likely to be brought before Parliament imminently with every prospect of success. A resolution in favour of the OWWR was carried unanimously. On 25th March a meeting was held in Evesham to gauge support. On the 4th April following, a public meeting in Kidderminster heard from Mr Elgie and Mr Hughes about the two schemes and supported the Oxford line by a majority of 3 to 1.
On 9th May 1844 another railway meeting was held in the Guildhall, Worcester to hear about the two schemes for joining Worcester to London. Mr Elgie and Mr Brunel appeared for the Oxford line while Mr Taunton and Mr Addison spoke for the line through to the London and Birmingham (becoming known as the 'Tring' line) which, at that time, was to be single track. Mr Brunel assured the meeting that the GWR line could be built for £1Million but Mr Hughes (still promoting the Grand Connection Railway) said the stretch from Worcester to Wolverhampton would cost that much and suggested it would be premature to take sides. However, the meeting agreed to back the Great Western project. On 22nd May 1844 a prospectus was issued on the Oxford, Worcester and Wolverhampton Railway for subscriptions with a capital of £1.5 Million, saying a lease with the Great Western Railway was in hand. It went via Banbury to Oxford. The Tring line was launched in June but connecting at Weedon with the London and Birmingham Railway; capital was also set at £1.5 Million. Meanwhile, the Birmingham and Gloucester Railway was preparing its own extension from Worcester to Wolverhampton with routing similar to the aborted Grand Connection Railway where they had acquired the interest. At the end of June deputations from the promoters of each scheme were heard in Banbury where the attendees came out in favour of the Oxford line. At 29th September's management meeting the Oxford proprietors altered the route to go directly to Oxford from Worcester (omitting Banbury!) and relaunched the Prospectus. In October the Weedon link was changed to Tring and the capital increased to £1.75 Million – a separate Bill was made for the extension to Wolverhampton. Meetings were held in Wolverhampton on 30th August, Dudley on 13th September and Stourbridge on 18th October 1844 by the Oxford line to seek support.
The scene was set for a battle royal and the Town meeting was fixed for the Guildhall in Worcester on 4th November 1844 with William Lewis, Mayor, presiding. Mr Waters proposed, Mr JW Lea seconded a motion that until the plans were deposited they were in no position to favour one scheme over the other. Leader Williams was suspicious about the Great Western's intentions. Mr Elgie said that Messrs Waters and Williams wanted no railway. Alderman Matthews, Francis Rufford and Mr Barlow spoke for the Oxford line and Mr E Shelton for the Tring line. Michael Grazebrook, a glass manufacturer from Stourbridge, said he had 1.5% more breakages when using the narrow gauge! There was almost unanimous support for the Oxford line. So, all three proposals were submitted by the 30th November 1844 submission date. This included depositing copies of the plans, cross sections and Books of Reference (land interests to acquire) with the Clerk of the Peace at the County and Town Councils through which they passed.
The Select Committee on Railways had suggested Committee (consisting of 5 Members) grouping of Bills by area and receiving the comments of the Board of Trade. Committee F were to consider the Railway Bills for the Oxford, Worcester and Rugby District including the Oxford Railway, GWR's proposal for an Oxford to Rugby Railway, the Tring line and the Birmingham and Gloucester Bills for a deviation via Worcester and Droitwich and the Wolverhampton extension. The Board of Trade gave notice on 20th August 1844 of their inquiry into the 2 Companies and their report of 28th February 1845 provides a comprehensive analysis of the justification for going ahead with either of the two schemes from Wolverhampton via Worcester to London. The Select Committee Reports had highlighted the need for Parliament not to authorise competing schemes covering similar ground while not restricting competition. The details of the Report are in the Appendix. The Wolverhampton to Worcester need was found to be well established and, on balance, they favoured the Tring scheme towards London. They were concerned, in particular, at where the break of gauge should be, preferring Bristol and Oxford.
The Report came as a blow to the Oxford, Worcester and Wolverhampton promoters but, having received a copy of the Report on 4th February, the shareholders met on 22nd February 1845 in Worcester (Francis Rufford of Belbroughton in the Chair) and agreed to go ahead with vigour. A public meeting on 25th March was told that only 140 people who had signed a petition in favour of the Tring scheme were from Worcester. Worcester Chamber of Commerce and Town Council continued to support the Oxford Bill. The Bills were scrutinised at the Committee stage with over 100 witnesses called and 12,148 questions asked. Eventually, the Oxford, Worcester and Wolverhampton Bill was passed by 247 votes to 113 in the House of Commons before more scrutiny in the House of Lords. The Tring Bill failed as did the Birmingham and Gloucester Railway's proposed extension to Wolverhampton (after the second readings on 2nd May and 15th May respectively). Royal Assent to the Oxford, Worcester and Wolverhampton Railway was given on 4th August 1845. However, the gauge question was not dead as freetrader Richard Cobden MP, who was opposed to the broad gauge moved a resolution proposing a Royal Commission to investigate the gauge question. This was passed and went ahead in 1846. While the broad gauge was specified in the Oxford Act, a mixed gauge was inserted in the Oxford and Rugby Railway Act.
One other proposed railway was subject to a November 1844 submission – the Leominster, Ludlow, Kidderminster and Birmingham Railway. This proposed a line via Woofferton, Tenbury and Dowles to Kidderminster with a branch to Stourport. The route was eventually similar to that adopted by the Tenbury and Bewdley Railway and the Kidderminster Loop Line. However, while shares were sold and plans, sections and a Bill of Reference were produced, it never appeared in the list for Parliamentary Committees so Standing Orders would not have been satisfied. More research is needed on who were the promoters although public meetings were held in Leominster on 7th November and Ludlow on 9th November 1844 who, on receiving a report on the route proposed by the Engineer, offered support. Mr Jeyes, the Solicitor, said they only wished to ascertain the feeling of the district.
Meetings were held in Leominster on 18th May 1844 to consider a railway between Worcester and Cardiff with Mr Evans of Eyton Hall presiding. Mr Powell an engineer from Brecon submitted his plans. This proposal was formally developed with a meeting at Merthyr Tydfil on 1st September. Support was given including representatives from the Aberdare area, to a line via Hereford and Stourport. Further meetings took place at the Oxford Arms Hotel in Kington on 18th September with Lord Bateman in the Chair; and at the Guildhall in Worcester on 20th September 1844. The route was now from Merthyr to Bewdley/Stourport or Worcester. It was confirmed that there was insufficient time to submit a Bill by 30th November 1844. A further meeting took place at Brecon on 4th November where the support from South Wales, Hereford, Worcester and Bewdley was reported. In all, 48 Railway Bills were sanctioned worth £15 Million in 1845.
The Manic 1845[edit | edit source]
In July 1844 the Registration, Incorporation and Regulation of Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 was given Royal Assent. This undoubtedly made it easier to promote new railways (before, you needed your own Act) and contributed to the mania. Each Company formally registered were required to:
- Issue a Prospectus with public notices
- Give its name, location and purposes
- Names of promoters, offices and subscribers
- Membership of the Committee acting in its formation
- Provisions for shareholder information
- Give access to Company books of accounts, selection of auditors and limitation of activities
It required annual full and fair accounts; and restricted the Directors actions (e.g. could not borrow from Company without shareholder approval). A 'Certificate of Complete Registration' was to be given by the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies when the amount of debt and equity capital was stated with the number of shares, names of subscribers with amounts and identity of Directors. The Act came into operation for registrations on 1st November 1844.
Railway Standing Orders required plans of the centre line along the route (also showing land affected and limits of deviation) with a longitudinal section, cross sections and a preamble and a Book of Reference listing all lands and properties affected including naming the interests. The need to accommodate existing highways and navigable waterways, especially where they needed to be changed, was to be set out. Particular attention was given to gradients, tight curves and the requirement for tunnels. All this required the services of a surveyor, engineer, lawyer and land agent prior to complete registration, as well as pursuing potential subscribers. Parliament had to be satisfied that the proposals were properly presented and justified with all interested parties notified including the Councils along the route.
The table attached sets out the proposals which came forward in 1845 which, at least in part, impacted on the Severn valley north of Worcester. The table shows the title (which sometimes changed), the date of Company registration, the places served and the prospectus details (note it usually set out a long list of supporters without specifying the Committee chairman). The final column tries to indicate what happened after submission. The information is taken from the Railway Times, Railway Chronicle and Railway Gazette for the period, the Register of Joint Stock Companies 1845 and the deposited plans with the County Councils (most can be found in the Worcestershire and Shropshire archives). Not all registered companies are included as some appear to have been inactive – The Kidderminster and Shrewsbury Railway from 25th September 1845 and the, intriguingly named, Cheltenham, Worcester and Chester and North and South-West of England Junction Railway of 4th November 1845 are examples.
There were four proposals that were to have run close to the River Severn from Worcester or Bewdley/Stourport to Ironbridge/Shrewsbury or beyond: the Worcester, Shrewsbury and Crewe Union Railway (mainly on the east bank); the Oxford and Worcester Extension and Crewe Junction Railway (broad gauge, running along the east bank); the Shropshire Union Railways and Canal Company branch from Shrewsbury to Worcester (narrow gauge, running along the west bank); and the Cambrian and Grand Junction Railway (broad gauge) from Hereford via Tenbury and Bewdley (running along the west bank to cross the river at Broseley) with a branch to Kidderminster. There was a further prospectus issued by the London and Holyhead Direct Railway Company for a line via Stourport, Bewdley, Bridgnorth and Shrewsbury but no detailed plans appear to have been issued and it deferred to the Worcester and Port Dynllaen Railway to deposit plans for a broad-gauge route. This line was engineered by Brunel (who had first tried in 1837, promoting Port Dynllaen on the north of the Lleyn peninsular as the departure point for Irish traffic). It would have been a spectacular line leaving Worcester via the Teme Valley and traversing the mountains of Wales. The plans drawn up show 8 tunnels, the longest being the Berwyn tunnel at 4950 yards and Cefn Glas tunnel at 4317 yards with ruling gradients at 1 in 100 and 1 in 66 for 8 miles.
The market towns of Herefordshire and Shropshire were particularly active in 1845 seeking to link to the trunk routes of the Grand Junction Railway (at Crewe, Stafford or Wolverhampton), the Birmingham and Gloucester Railway at Worcester or even the authorised Oxford, Worcester and Wolverhampton line, on which work had yet to commence, at Kidderminster. Promoters also had in mind links beyond to the mid-Wales coast or the South Wales coalfield – the latter wanted access to the Black Country and Birmingham. A number of east-west projects were planned with the valley of the Teme or the Severn being chosen to circumnavigate the Malvern or Shropshire hills. Therefore, the route from Tenbury via Cleobury Mortimer, Bewdley/Stourport to Kidderminster features in three schemes: the Welsh Midland Railway, the Direct East and West Junction Railway, and the Birmingham and Aberystwyth Direct Railway as well as the previously mentioned Cambrian and Grand Junction Railway. All involved crossing the River Severn north or south of Bewdley and most involved a tunnel through the ridge to the east. Looking at the plans produced reveals a remarkable lack of settlements adequately served en-route (there was no requirement to show station locations although they could be highlighted in the preamble).
The final grouping was the attempt to link South Staffordshire to Bridgnorth or Coalbrookdale from east to west. Both schemes were registered in the autumn of 1845 so had little time for the surveyor and engineer to prepare the plans. The Dudley, Madeley, Broseley and Ironbridge Railway ran to the east of Bridgnorth and was amended with less than 4 weeks to go to extend from Ironbridge to Shrewsbury. The Wolverhampton, Bridgnorth and Ludlow Railway was characterised by a difficult crossing of the River Severn and gradients beyond. That leaves the Birmingham, Wolverhampton and Stour Valley Railway who proposed branches south of Dudley including one through Blackheath (tunnel) before following the River Stour through Halesowen, Cradley Heath, Lye, Stourbridge, Cookley, and Kidderminster ending alongside the River Severn at Stourport (Bill No 2).
Apart from the list given, there were other competing lines close to our patch for at least part of the route. Apart from the Shropshire Union's proposal between Shrewsbury and Wellington, there was the Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway (£1100k capital) and the Shrewsbury, Wolverhampton and South Staffordshire Railway Company with similar ideas. Between Wolverhampton, Dudley and Birmingham, there was not only the Birmingham, Wolverhampton and Stour Valley proposal but also the Birmingham, Wolverhampton and Dudley Railway. South of Worcester there was the Worcester, Hereford, Ross and Gloucester Railway which linked to Hereford and Monmouth Railway at Ross on Wye (authorised in August 1844) but now no Kidderminster branch on the Worcester and South Wales Railway. To the west, the Worcester, Tenbury and Ludlow Railway (Engineer William Gravatt) adopted the same route between those towns as the Worcester and Port Dynllaen Railway. Shrewsbury to Hereford also had two competing schemes that were deposited in November 1845.
Unlike 1844, there appear to have been only a few public meetings in the district recorded in the Worcestershire Chronicle. The Welsh Midland held meetings at the Guildhall, Bewdley on 27th August 1845, Kidderminster on 3rd September and at Worcester later that month when landowners, manufacturers and dignitaries were present – support was offered to a link to Kidderminster and Worcester. The Birmingham, Wolverhampton and Stour Valley Company held meetings in West Bromwich and Wednesbury in October referring to the planned branch to Stourport to link up with the Welsh Midland (who were to drop their link to Birmingham). Many schemes seem to rely on the public notices in the County papers and Bradshaw's or Herepath's Railway Journals which appeared weekly during the summer and autumn. Most prospectuses forecast rosy futures for their promoted line, describing the engineering as easy with much improved access for trade by linking to London, Liverpool, Birmingham, Manchester and Wales (the scheme usually went nowhere near these places!).
As to be expected, surveyors, engineers and cartographers were much in demand – perusal of the list shows that Engineers were engaged on many lines at the same time and as railway engineering was still in its infancy, they relied on limited geological information and visual inspection of the routes (landowners didn't always cooperate). Parliament didn't help by changing their Standing Order requirements during the year – a deputation of railway promoters descending on the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel and the Chairman of the Board of Trade, William Gladstone to object (e.g. requiring different scale plans through built up areas). They had limited success. As the submission date of 30th November got closer, activity became even more frantic with Directors wanting to be sure the plans were in place and that Parliamentary Standing Orders could be satisfied. Not only had plans to be deposited at the Board of Trade's Whitehall Office by midnight but copies of the bound plans, Book of Reference and preamble had to be deposited with the Clerk of the Peace at all the offices of the districts affected – quite a logistical exercise for the Secretaries, Solicitors and Engineers responsible.
Over 1250 schemes were involved although a significant number were from established Companies who bundled them together. The majority of Companies left arrangements to be made during the last week and many hoped to deliver on the last day which happened to be a Sunday! The Offices opened at 1pm and queues formed all day including after midnight with attempts to persuade the doormen to let them in on the Monday – some plans were thrown through the door. Engines and a carriage were hired on the London and Birmingham Railway and the Great Western Railway to London (3 up trains) and from London 10 down trains to Bristol and Taunton to reach provincial county towns. In the latter case a collision between two of the trains at Slough placed the delivery of plans in jeopardy although one engine was re-railed and sped away at to reach Exeter at a late hour. Available horses were said to be scarce and were charged at extortionate values on the day.
The consequence of this mania was to alarm the nation and Parliament while many proposals were rejected and promoters deflated. Notices lodged at the Private Bill Office where plans had been deposited were recorded on 31st December 1845 for the following relevant Railways:
- Birmingham, Wolverhampton and Stour Valley (but not the Stourport branch)
- Cambrian and Grand Junction
- Direct East and West Junction (Kidderminster to Leominster)
- Shropshire Union Railways and Canal (but not Shrewsbury to Worcester)
- Welsh Midland (as far as Worcester and Kidderminster)
- Wolverhampton, Bridgnorth and Ludlow (omitting Bridgnorth to Ludlow)
- Worcester and Port Dynllaen (and Worcester, Tenbury and Ludlow Railway)
- Worcester and South Wales Junction (and Worcester and Merthyr Tydfil Railway)
In total 718 projects were registered (216 by established Companies) with 549 failing to meet the deadline. There was still the matter of deposits (10%) to be paid to the Accountant General. The newspapers calculated that the Capital involved in the correctly lodged projects was over £300 Million requiring total deposits of over £30 Million. Parliament had been spooked by the potential withdrawal of so much money (£10,000 in 1845 equates to £1.2 Million in 2020) at one time on the economy so had agreed to payment by instalments.
The Aftermath[edit | edit source]
Parliament reconvened on 20th January 1846 and by the end of the month the two Houses had agreed to appoint a Select Committee to consider how to deal with such a large number of Railway Bills and how to seek to reduce the number of schemes and the call on capital through selection and amalgamation. Such a committee was in addition to the Standing Orders Committee. The Select Committee on the Merits of the Bills, as they became known, recommended Sub-Committees in 65 groupings covering mainly geographical areas including Ireland, Scotland and Wales. The Committees started work in March working through to July 1846; formal readings of Bills went on in parallel as the selections were made. On 4th July 1846 the Railway Companies' Dissolution Bill was approved which allowed the use of a resolution of the Company to dissolve the Company rather than relying on bankruptcy or a winding-up Act.
As could be expected, there were repercussions for the Directors and shareholders following the failure to submit the documents on time. The Management Committee of the Dudley, Madeley, Broseley and Ironbridge Railway met at the Stork Hotel in Birmingham on 10th December 1845. The plans were recorded as 53 minutes late arriving at the Offices of the Board of Trade. The Engineer, Frances Giles, was blamed as some plans could not be located at Mr Houghton's office where the Solicitor, Mr Peele, also had copies of the Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway and the Worcester, Shrewsbury and Crewe Union Railway. Despite hiring an engine from Birmingham to London, the arrival was late. It was agreed to dismiss Frances Giles. In January the Directors agreed to amalgamate with the Shrewsbury and Birmingham (which included a branch to Coalbrookdale) with shareholders receiving two £25 shares for every three held in the abortive Company.
The Directors of the Oxford and Worcester Extension and Chester Junction Railway threw in the towel by agreeing to dissolve the Company on 30th January 1846 which was finally agreed by the shareholders at a meeting in London on 28th November 1846, Peter Morrison in the Chair. Of the 90,000 shares allotted, the number paid up was only 6,650. The Directors agreed to help meet the expenses outstanding and offered £1 1s per share to holders of scrip (paper substantiating their shareholding) where £2 2s had been paid. The plans for the Birmingham and Aberystwyth Direct Railway are not recorded as even late, so the promoters may have withdrawn earlier. The documents for the Worcester, Shrewsbury and Crewe Union Railway were submitted but they are not recorded by the Board of Trade as received (as the London, Worcester and South Staffordshire Railway had failed a few months before, finishing at Stourport was a problem) – Frances Giles was also involved in this scheme!
Some of the projects that were registered hardly fared any better. The Wolverhampton, Bridgnorth and Ludlow Railway, having plans that only reached Bridgnorth is not mentioned further in the Railway press. The Worcester and South Wales Junction Railway concluded an arrangement with the Worcester, Hereford, Ross and Gloucester Railway encouraged by Brunel from the Great Western Railway. Every holder of 2 shares would receive 1 share in each company and have returned £2 deposit in the former Company. That Bill failed at the Committee stage and the Company was dissolved on 1st August 1845. The Cambrian and Grand Junction Directors did try to challenge whether Standing Orders were satisfied but on 17th January William Collins MP, Chairman, reported the estimate of construction was higher than expected (William Gravatt was blamed) and they were withdrawing the application. There was said to be only £77,000 in paid-up shares with £20,000 expended so £160,000 was outstanding to pay the deposit to the Accountant General. Winding up followed at a meeting on 12th October with 28s per share to be returned although some shareholders did try to hold a further meeting in December to ask for more but insufficient turned up.
The Direct East and West Junction Railway was in an even worse state. With only 17,300 shares out of 40,000 allotted (only 8,212 were paid up) there were insufficient monies to go to Parliament separately so they had made arrangements with the erstwhile Derbyshire, Staffordshire and Worcestershire Railway who were planning a 30mile line from Uttoxeter to Dudley to use monies that had been deposited for their shares (17,000 were sold out of 30,000 with 12,195 paid for). They circulated shareholders on the 23rd February about the amalgamation requesting their assent to the action. The Direct East and West Junction failed to pass the Standing Orders stage due to engineering issues, while the Derbyshire, Staffordshire and Worcestershire Railway was curtailed to cover only 14 miles to Rugeley, but while passed by the Commons it was thrown out by the Lords. Shareholders claimed that all correspondence went unanswered. The Railway Protestor Office agreed to investigate the affairs in January 1848 and found that the amalgamation was illegal and a third of expenditure was used to rig the market (through buying their own shares). Winding up was achieved in 1851.
The Worcester and Port Dynllaen Railway made more progress. They offered terms to the Directors of the Worcester, Tenbury and Ludlow Railway Company who had accepted on 10th February 1846. The latter's petition for the Bill was subsequently withdrawn. By 12th March the Standing Orders Committee had found that they were not completed as the subscription contract did not amount to ¾ of the estimate. The Great Western Railway offered £1 Million towards completion although the document wasn't binding. There had been a Select Committee of Parliament since July 1844 looking at the Gauge issue which was expected to report soon (the GWR expected that the broad gauge would not find favour) so they asked for the hearings on the Worcester and Port Dynllaen to be postponed although it received a 2nd reading on 18th March. At the Great Western meeting at Paddington on 25th May with Charles Russell in the chair, progress with various Railway Bills was reported. They were still targeting Dublin traffic with the Worcester scheme but would reconsider if it couldn't be built to the broad gauge. Amid disquiet, a shareholder reported that Port Dynllaen required improvements as access could be dangerous – who was going to pay? The Directors agreed to investigate. The Board of Trade Report on Gauges was published on 6th June 1846 recommending no new lines be built to broad gauge except on GWR 'territory'. That Report together with the Government deciding to improve the port at Holyhead, meant the scheme did not proceed. In December the Directors of the dormant Worcester, Tenbury and Ludlow Railway sought interest in re-applying to Parliament in November 1847 while the West Midland Railway (Engineer Edward Wilson of Worcester) attempted to revive the Worcester and Port Dynllaen proposals in 1860, both were unsuccessful.
The project that received the most criticism was the Welsh Midland Railway. It was the most ambitious linking West and South Wales to the Marches and Birmingham with a capital cost of £4 Million. It attracted investors across the country with a long list of well-considered supporters. Worcester Town Council met on 6th January to consider the notices and plans they had received. They did not like the plans for the Welsh Midland or the Worcester and South Wales Junction Railways – the former going through the Cattle Market and the latter proposing a 20 feet high embankment through the town. They were supportive of the Worcester and Port Dynllaen (and the Worcester, Tenbury and Ludlow scheme). While the Welsh Midland passed through the Standing Orders stage, there were said to be inaccuracies in the plans and sections with Number 3 Select Committee hearing allegations on 24th February. On 3rd March the Committee considered that the plans deposited were inaccurate with the promoters wishing to substitute some plans. On 18th March it was decided that Standing Orders could not be dispensed with for the Welsh Midland and it was subsequently thrown out. The Directors met and agreed to amalgamate with the Brecon and Merthyr Railway. There had been possible amalgamation with the Shrewsbury and Hereford Railway in May providing they would entertain the narrow gauge.
On 1st August shareholders were approached saying the result of the present session in Parliament has been that the Shrewsbury and Hereford Railway and the Newport, Abergavenny and Hereford Railway are confirmed with other lines rejected. The Directors said they had by agreement secured an interest of 1/3rd of the capital in the Newport, Abergavenny and Hereford Railway (equivalent to 9,000 shares) The Directors suggested that they could only return 15s per share on Welsh Midland and 7s 6d per share on Brecon and Merthyr shares. To enable shareholders to exercise options the Companies would be dissolved and they asked for a response by 1st September to (a) exchange with Newport, Abergavenny and Hereford (b) transfer to a new company to promote a line between Hereford and Swansea or (c) refund of the 15s or 7s 6d. This appears to have caused ructions among shareholders and the railway press with accusations of unfair allocation of shares (in dribbles) and excessive spending of shareholders' funds.
On 18th September a scripholders meeting with Viscount Hereford, Charman, presiding was held at the London Tavern. A blow-by-blow account was given. The Welsh Midland was launched in April 1845 with shares oversubscribed. A month later saw the prospectuses launched for the Brecon and Merthyr Railway and the Shrewsbury and Herefordshire Railway who were proposing to link into the Welsh Midland at Brecon and Leominster respectively. On 22nd July 1845 the initial survey was completed with concern growing at the number of competing projects, so extensions were added (e.g. to Carmarthen). The full plans were submitted on time to the Board of Trade. A letter was received on 9th December from Messrs Baxter, Rose and Norton, the Solicitors, describing the events of the previous month. Mr Sidney Hall of Sherrard and Hall had taken on the task of managing the sections but had fallen seriously ill. Mr Baxter proceeded to Brecon on 14th November to find Sidney Hall was confined to bed in Somerset with little likelihood of returning to work in time. Mr Baxter found the surveying and levelling in arrears but by strenuous efforts with Mr Pritchard had managed to meet the deadline although they were unable check the plans in detail.
The Directors of the Welsh Midland Railway had met on 21st and 28th March to consider options following the rejection. They were faced with many conditional agreements and outstanding bills from the Surveyors and Solicitors. Among the assets were £18,250 deposited with the Treasurer of the Brecon and Abergavenny Canal Company for conditional purchase and £10,140 invested in the Monmouthshire Railway Company in fulfilment of one of the conditions upon which the amalgamation with the Newport, Abergavenny and Hereford Railway Company was to have been carried out. The Chairman said delays in meeting shareholders arose from the difficulty in drawing the accounts together. They had decided at the Board meeting on 11th June to abandon the undertaking and dissolve the Company. The Directors were prepared to proceed with the distribution of 15s per share which was all that could be afforded. Mr Baxter said that around 500 miles had to be surveyed for the additional works proposed compared to the 160 miles originally envisaged, hence the larger bills. Mr Sherrard said that his firm warned against the inaccuracies in the drawings in January but were not responsible. After receiving testimonies from two MPs and fellow Directors the meeting supported the dissolution and the share distribution put forward.
That brings us to the two Companies who were successful in obtaining Royal assents on 3rd August 1846. These were the Birmingham, Wolverhampton and Stour Valley Railway Company (the Stour Valley line between Birmingham and Wolverhampton with branch to Dudley £1.1 Million capital) and the Shropshire Union Railway and Canal Company who succeeded with 3 lines: Chester to Wolverhampton (£1 Million capital); Newtown to Crewe (£1.5 Million capital) and Shrewsbury to Stafford (£0.8 Million capital). Neither the former, the Stour Valley line, which dropped the Shrewsbury to Worcester section prior to submission, or the latter, the Shropshire Union, which dropped the branch to Stourport before completing the plans, included a 'Severn Valley' scheme. They were both courted by the big players – the Grand Junction, the London and Birmingham and the Great Western which offered financial support and help through Parliament.
On 9th May 1846 the Parliament Standing Orders were changed requiring a meeting of shareholders representing at least 1/3rd of the capital proposed to be raised by the Bill to vote in favour. The two Companies had to call meetings of shareholders to comply as they were at the Committee stage. A meeting of scripholders of the Shropshire Union was held in Manchester on 14th May who passed a resolution "that it was not desirable to proceed with any of the Bills before Parliament unless some of the powerful Companies in active cooperation were prepared to guarantee shareholders 5% interest per annum on capital". A Committee was formed to attend the shareholders meeting called at Shrewsbury on 22nd May. They doubted the estimated returns produced by Cubitt and Stephenson. The required approval was given on 22nd May but on 20th June a petition of shareholders representing 20,000 shares was presented to the House of Commons asking for progress on the Bills to be stopped – it was referred to the Committee on Bills. On 24th June a shareholder wrote to the Railway Times from Wakefield deprecating the failure to include the Shrewsbury to Worcester proposals.
The Stour Valley scripholders met on 23rd May in Birmingham with Robert Scott MP in the chair. As there were shareholders present who represented the equivalent of 63,685 shares, the requisite number to meet 2/3rd of the capital was sufficient to satisfy the new Standing Order when the vote was taken. The call had referred to considering the Bills for not only the Birmingham, Wolverhampton and Dudley but also from Smethwick to Stourport with branches – so this link wasn't completely forgotten (they hoped to submit the branch in November 1846). Amendments were suggested to the Line in Committees in early July when the Bills were passed for the third time. At the end of July, the Bills had completed the House of Lords stage ready for Royal Assent. The competing projects: the Birmingham, Wolverhampton and Dudley Railway; the Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway; and the Shrewsbury, Wolverhampton and South Staffordshire Railway also received Royal Assent at the same time on 3rd August 1846. There was shareholder and Parliament encouragement to consider amalgamation and talks were held to try and reach agreement. At the end of August 1846 provisional agreement was reached between the Shrewsbury and Birmingham and the Shrewsbury, Wolverhampton and South Staffordshire Junction Railway (they had tried before in May but failed). The arrangements were that the Shrewsbury and Birmingham would construct a line along the 20 miles between Wellington and Wolverhampton and the Shropshire Union would build the line from Wellington to Stafford with joint ownership between Shrewsbury and Wellington. They were given a ¼ share of the Stour Valley line who also came to an arrangement with the Birmingham, Wolverhampton and Dudley Railway.
In summary, out of around 1250 Bills deposited on 30th November 1845 only 516 made it through to the Committee stages with around half receiving Royal assent. This still represented £84 Million of capital to be spent over the following 3 years with borrowing of an additional £30 Million authorised. This is equivalent to £13.7 Billion in today's money. It is little wonder that, while receiving the powers many still failed to complete and amalgamations continued to reduce the number. 1846 did however did see the start of work on construction of the Oxford, Worcester and Wolverhampton Railway which, despite many adventures on the way (another story) was eventually finished with Kidderminster station opening on 1st May 1852 when there was more interest in linking Bewdley and Bridgnorth onto the rail network again.
Conclusions[edit | edit source]
Economic conditions and easy availability of investment capital helped fuel the mania. The British industrial revolution created an affluent and sizable middle class who were keen to enlarge their wealth through investment. The depressed state of the economy in the late 1830s and early 1840s had passed and interest rates were cut from 5.1% in 1839 to 2.7% in 1845 leading to Government stocks being less attractive. An analysis of shareholders in the first railways shows not only landowners, manufacturers, MPs, the professional classes (bankers and solicitors) and clergymen but also merchants, shopkeepers and workers. Shares were often available in £5 or £10 amounts which appealed to the small investor.
The success of the railway companies in the 1830s enabled them to pay high dividends, which explains the increased optimism in the 1840s. By the end of 1840 the major cities of London, Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester and Leeds were connected by trunk railway routes. The reliance on local markets and the restricted movement via the highways, rivers and canals for overseas trade precipitated the opening up of the country and the expansion of the industrial and commercial areas. It became clear to the Chambers of Commerce and the leaders of Town Councils that they needed to attract this improved form of transport to their areas. The foregoing shows the ease in gaining resolutions in support, at least to the ideas.
Gavin Campbell in his article on 'The Railway Mania – Not so great expectations' reports the growth in the value of railway shares between January 1843 and October 1845 as 106% with the growth for new companies exceeding that of established railways. Similarly, dividends rose from an average of 4.5% on capital to 6.5% on capital with, again, new companies exceeding the established companies. New and existing investors thought they were on a winner. Stock was highly prized and the railway press reported weekly movements. The growth in the number of companies allowed even more people to invest especially as they only had to commit 10% up front with some only promising to pay (especially where certain shares were retained for land owners or where dignatories lent their name to the Prospectus). The 1844 Joint Stock Companies Act made it easier to form such companies and appeared to give credence to their proposals through registration.
A contributory factor was the limited Government regulation or intervention. Anyone with sufficient financial means, or the capacity to borrow sufficient funds, could form a railway company, raise capital, and put forward an application for a Railway Bill to Parliament that would propose railway routes and enable land to be acquired. Virtually no real checks existed on the financial viability of a proposed railway line with the justification being left to the free market. Parliament did encourage questions to be asked during the Committee stages but the high number of Bills that were presented in 1844 and 1845 meant that the issues were largely left to petitioners against the Bill who could not always afford to be represented at Committee. The demand for lawyers and engineers in 1845 and 1846 precluded many Railway Boards from paying for such additional services – established companies were more likely to be represented at the Committee stages.
As the mania became self-evident in the autumn of 1845, Parliament took action, strengthening Standing Orders and introducing additional scrutiny through the selection process but the sheer volume of business meant that what would appear to be competing schemes were given authority. This resulted in amalgamations and the difficulty in following up calls to collect capital at the start of the construction phase. The inevitable happened with prospectuses being over optimistic on traffic forecasts, too much demand on the civil engineering profession in 1845 leaving the deposited documents having shortcomings even when the deadline was met, and inadequate capital from the shares paid for to meet the deposits required. This was not helped by the failure of the potato crop and the high price of corn in 1846.
The inevitable happened with share prices falling 20% in one month, declining by 67% to 1850. Dividends also fell by 70% from the 1843 level by 1850. The large number of dissolved companies meant that shareholders not only saw their values drop but lost up to 50% of the funds paid in when meeting their obligations. This was particularly true of the more rural areas where there was less likelihood that the project would be authorised. Many of the supporters or shareholders in the prospectuses would be familiar to historians of the towns of Bewdley, Bridgnorth, Kidderminster and Stourport and it must have been a salutary lesson. It wasn't until after 1850 that the shares began to grow in value and many more schemes were promoted including that for the Severn Valley Railway.
Sources of Information[edit | edit source]
- Railway Journals for 1844, 1845 and 1846: Railway Times; Bradshaw's Railway Gazette; Herepath's Railway Chronicle
- Local newspapers (e.g. Worcestershire Chronicle)
- Worcestershire in the 19th Century by TC Turberville
- Plans, and Prospectuses from deposits in 1844 and 1845 in the Worcestershire and Shropshire Archives
- Bentley's Directory of Worcestershire in 1840
- The Oxford, Worcester & Wolverhampton Railway by SC Jenkins & HI Quayle (The Oakwood Press 1977)
- The Severn Valley Railway by John Marshall (David & Charles 1989)
- The Railway Mania – Not so great expectations by Gavin Campbell (voxeu.org)
- The Development of the Railway Network in Britain 1825-1911 by Leigh Shaw-Taylor and Xuesheng You (Campop.geog.cam)